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A Discussion with David Epstein 
[Editor's note: David Epstein's Shaping Time l is reviewed in this 
issue of Indiana Theory Review. We invited Professor Epstein to 
discuss ideas set forth in that book, as well as in his earlier writings. 
Given the geographical distance between us, the practical way to do this 
was by correspondence. We therefore sent Professor Epstein questions 
that were prepared by various students at Indiana University. Those 
questions, and his responses, follow here.] 
What are your current thoughts on Beyond Orpheus/ now that it 
has been almost twenty years since its first appearance? What kind of 
impact did it have on the theoretical community? Are there any aspects 
of it that are still relevant to your current work? 
To take the second of your questions first, readers who have not 
gone through the experience of publishing a book may be surprised to 
learn how enigmatic and largely impressionistic an author's sense of the 
impact of his or her book may be. From my publishers I have "hard" 
figures about sales of the book, which went through a number of 
printings in its hard- and soft-cover editions. I'm told that for our 
relatively small community of music theorists and scholars these figures 
constitute sales success, though I cannot judge from these numbers how 
many people actually read the book, or what impact it may have 
had-pro or con-upon their thinking. 
How else does one judge the impact of a book? Citations, 
IDavid Epstein, Shaping Time: Music, the Brain, and Performance (New York: 
Schirmer Books, 1995). 
2David Epstein, Beyond Orpheus: Studies in Musical Structure (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1979). 
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quotations, reviews, and discussions of the book are primary ways. 
Beyond Orpheus received a good number of reviews both here and 
abroad, the majority of them favorable, many of them extensive. As for 
citations, I see them not infrequently in the course of my reading, 
though I am not an author who combs the literature to check upon his 
"citation quotient."3 
A more interesting aspect of a book is the discussion it provokes, 
and the research that it may stimulate. I read fairly often of 
dissertations based upon ideas in Beyond Orpheus, or that track 
consequences of its concepts. In much the same way, I find colleagues 
who want to discuss aspects of the book. From these various criteria, 
most of which, as mentioned earlier, are more impressionistic than 
"hard," I sense that the book has had an impact upon the theoretical 
community. 
As for the other parts of your question-what are my current 
thoughts about the book, and are there aspects of it that are still 
relevant to my current work-there are indeed aspects of it still relevant 
to my present work. Shaping Time, as I state early in its preface, is an 
outgrowth of Beyond Orpheus and rests upon many findings and 
assumptions of the earlier book. The importance of Schoenberg's 
Grundgestalt as a basis for compositional unity and the "marriage" of 
aspects of Grundgestalt thinking and Schenkerian views of tonal 
behavior are cases in point. They seem as significant to me today as 
they did in the 1970s, when Beyond Orpheus was in gestation. 
I had the feeling after completing Beyond Orpheus that time in 
music, in its many manifestations, was inadequately treated, and 
further, that it was inadequately understood by most of us who pursue 
music as performers, composers, and theorists. It was that sense, 
indeed frustration, that motivated the studies found in Shaping Time. I 
3The scientific world has a publication called The Citation Index, which tracks 
citations. (The reigning champion a few years ago clocked in at some 33,000 entries.) 
Not a few university deans rely upon the Index for determining professional standings of 
their faculty, a bad dream we artists have so far been spared. Think how a modest 
contribution would figure in that world-a simple, standardized procedure for a chemistry 
experiment, say, that every experimenter would use, with accompanying citation. How 
the numbers would mount-the stuff of pace setters, indeed. 
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was lucky, during the early stages of those studies, to meet Prof. Ernst 
Poppel, founder of the Institute for Medical Psychology at the 
University of Munich and an authority on temporal controls in the 
human nervous system. Our discussions about musical timing, and the 
role that the brain and the nervous system must play in structuring and 
shaping time in music, expanded my thinking about time and music in 
ways heretofore absent. Poppel was a force in the evolution of the 
thinking in the later book; I am endlessly grateful to him. 
In 1991 during the Mozart Bicentennial, Erich Leinsdorf conducted 
the New York Philharmonic in a program ordered exactly as Mozart 
had done two hundred years earlier. The concert began with the first 
one, two, or three movements of one of the composer's later 
symphonies. [Our memory is a little sketchy about some of the details.} 
The orchestra ended the concert with the final movement of the same 
symphony. In light of this situation, how would you justify your theory 
that a continuous pulse underlies the four movements in Mozart's 
symphonies? 
The justification is not hard to come by. To be sure, playing 
movements of works out of sequence was one of many concert customs 
in Mozart's day and later, though this was not to the universal 
exclusion of presenting works serially in their entirety. However they 
may have been played, the composition of these works embraced 
mutual elements that served as unifying agents throughout the music. 
Insight into this fact was one of Schoenberg's major contributions to 
musical understanding, indeed to music theory. Space prevents 
discussing this matter in depth here, but it is not necessary, as this is 
the overriding idea pursued in detail in Beyond Orpheus. 
My thinking about tempo continuity derives from this Grundgestalt 
notion of Schoenberg. Tempo and tempo relationships, in my view, are 
but one of many formative elements that unify works in the classical 
and ensuing eras. The great value of this sense of tempo is its 
usefulness for a performing artist in determining a viable tempo. One 
is forced to see the work as a whole, in all its elements, modifications 
of pulse, evolutionary patterns of design, and the like. These elements 
tend to fall in place when seen within a global view of how the music 
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may progress. A local view, by contrast, may allow all manner of 
tempo choices, though some of them may come upon rocky shoals as 
the music moves ahead. 
The basis of tempo choice is intuitive, and rightly so, no matter 
what the composer's indications may be. Continuous pulse as a theory 
assists in refining that intuition, placing it within a viable overall 
perspective. 
With regard to Leinsdorf's 1991 performance or, for that matter, 
this practice as pursued in Mozart's time, there is much that I would 
like to know that is not available, or at least not accessible, as I write 
this. What, for example, was Leinsdorf's tempo for the last movement, 
and how did it correlate with the earlier movements? To what extent 
did tempo memory establish for Leinsdorf a tempo range, upon which 
he drew when coming 'round to the final movement? It is not irrelevant 
that Leinsdorf strongly believed in correlated tempos and a continuous 
pulse. That fact alone leads me to believe that tempo relationships must 
have been a factor in the tempos Leinsdorf chose in the 1991 concert. 4 
In Beyond Orpheus (pp. 87-88), you posit a ratio of 2:3 between 
the Adagio Introduction and the ensuing Allegro in Beethoven's 
Symphony no. 1, first movement. You justify your assertion by noting 
that the composer's metronome marking for the Adagio seems 
impractically fast. Nevertheless, the lack of an integral ratio between 
the metronome markings for the two sections suggests that Beethoven 
intended that the Allegro begin with a new pulse. Indeed, doing so 
underlies the contrasts between the even and legato eighth-note rhythms 
of the Adagio and the dotted eighth-note and staccato eighth-note 
rhythms of the Allegro. When might the element of "surprise" and 
contrast between two tempos supersede a performer's desire to relate 
the two sections by a constant pulse? 
There may be a misunderstanding here, caused perhaps by some 
lack of clarity in the chart on p. 87 of Beyond Orpheus. The 
4Leinsdorf's ideas about this facet of tempo are found in his book, The Composer's 
Advocate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). I discuss them on pp. 121-22 of 
Shaping Time. 
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misunderstanding concerns a specific tempo relationship rather than the 
fundamental theory of proportional relationships, so the matter is less 
world-shaking than it would otherwise be. To clear it up, however: I 
posit a 1: 1 relationship between the Adagio molto and the Allegro con 
brio in the first movement of the Beethoven First Symphony. (Thus the 
eighth note in the Adagio moho equals the half note in the ensuing 
Allegro, as shown.) The 2:3 ratio you mention applies between 
movements I and II. 
Before getting to the essence of your question, we should discuss 
two other points, First, you mention that Beethoven's 88: 112 
metronome indications in this movement lack an integral ratio. They 
are in fact close to one: 88:112=.786. A precise 4:3 ratio between 
these tempi would be .75. The difference, .036, amounts to a 
discrepancy of 4.8%. By the lights of the Weber Fraction, as discussed 
in detail in Shaping Time (chapter 7, and throughout the following 
chapters), this is a marginal difference whose perception is 
questionable. Second, you suggest that Beethoven's intention was that 
the Allegro begin with a new pulse. So the metronome markings 
indicate. I suggest, however, that the issue is anything but simple or 
clear-cut. Space doesn't allow this complex argument here, but you 
may want to read my discussion of the matter, particularly vis-a-vis 
Beethoven's metronome markings, in Shaping Time (pp. 196-202, and 
in the musical examples that follow; also p. 498 n. 3). 
The essence of your question I find very interesting, indeed rich in 
implications-namely, that the different tempos intended by Beethoven 
underlie the contrasts between the even and legato eighth-note rhythms 
of the Adagio and the dotted and staccato eighth-note rhythms of the 
Allegro. When might the element of "surprise" and contrast, you ask, 
supersede a performer's desire to relate the two sections by a constant 
pulse? 
In response I suggest that these issues are not in contradiction. A 
faster, unrelated Allegro tempo may help denote this contrast in 
articulation, but I am not at all sure that this kind of emphasis is 
needed, nor that the essence of the contrast lies within this faster 
tempo. 
Were the suggested M.M. 88 tempo for the Allegro impossibly 
6 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 17/2 
slow, you would be right beyond question. That is not the case, 
however. One can easily articulate the dotted and staccato qualities at 
this pace. In some ways it may be easier at the slower tempo, as there 
is more time to shape these articulations. From my podium experience, 
in fact, I have found M.M. 112 rather fast for achieving the very 
articulation that you discuss (unless the players use period instruments 
and play in what is advocated currently as the authentic olden style, but 
that is yet another issue). What often results is a blurred, if not 
"breathless," performance. 
The issue is more general: surprise and contrast are often achieved 
in the big works of the classic-romantic periods through total changes 
in character (articulation, tone quality, dynamics, harmonic rhythm), 
even when the prevailing pulse between two markedly different tempos 
is essentially the same. What happens in these instances, as I perceive 
them, is a yin and yang phenomenon. The contrasts are so great, the 
surprises so unexpected, that we often are unaware of the underlying 
unity of pulse. 
If we are unaware of this unifying pulse, then why the concern to 
achieve it? For two reasons, as I see it. One is the remarkable beauty 
that we may experience on some level by the connections in character 
provided by pulse related this way. 5 The second reason concerns what 
I might call the propriety of tempo-what the classic era saw as "just" 
tempo (tempo giusto). If we are guided purely by our emotions in 
setting a new tempo, we may (and often do) in the heat of the moment 
select a tempo that is too slow or fast for the best overall control and 
shaping of the music. Proportionally related tempos, which I find 
emanate from fundamental facts of neurophysiology, tend to prevent 
these excesses. Put otherwise, the great composers had deep 
perceptions in these tempo matters, perceptions that almost invariably 
led to tempos that fit well, that allow for the best playing, the richest 
emotional qualities of the music. What they perceived seems 
proportional in its structure. 
5See, for example, two cases discussed in Shaping Time: Mozart, Symphony no. 39, 
mvt. 1 (pp. 14-17); and Brahms, Symphony no. 2, mvt. 3 (pp. 266-69). 
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In Shaping Time (pp. 5-6), you stress that meaningful statements 
concerning musical time must be based on extensive experience with the 
music, preferably in a peiformance setting. Therefore, can theorists 
write meaningfully about an idiom with which they are not familiar as 
performers (for example, a non-conductor writing about orchestral 
music)? If they cannot, what are your reservations? 
I hope my statement does not sound dogmatic; it was not intended 
that way. That one must have extensive experience with timing aspects 
of a work, if meaningful statements are to ensue, seems almost 
axiomatic. Timing is complex; our perception of matters temporal 
varies over time. We best gain insights through depth of experience 
within the numerous worlds of musical timing (rhythm, meter, 
articulation, dynamics, agogics, tempo, tempo relations, rubato, etc.). 
As for our experience of a work preferably being in a performance 
setting: Again, I hope my answer will not come across as dogmatic. 
People come by insights in numerous ways. Some have great 
sensitivities, complex insights, derived independently of performance-
even of musical education or training, for that matter. Whatever the 
source of insight, I treasure it. 
That said, I do believe that performance is a marvelous teacher for 
matters musical, much of which involve aspects of timing. The reason 
would seem obvious: music fundamentally exists when it is sound 
flowing through real time. Experienced otherwise, what we deal with 
is often a memory, or an imaginative projection, of music. 
The making of music, in other words, is the cauldron in which the 
stuff is cooked, shaped, tried out. Performance is thereby a unique 
testing ground for ideas and concepts. What may work in our heads, in 
our inner ear, may work less well in the rehearsal room, failing in 
ways that the printed page cannot tell us and that our keen inner 
hearing may not even predict. The flaws may have to do with 
instruments, how they produce sound, how they articulate, whatever; 
it may concern perception-what is easy for us may be clumsy for 
others to grasp, however disparate the reasons. 
This is not to say that all performers are de Jacto founts of musical 
knowledge. Would that this were the case. I am speaking of continually 
evaluated performance-performance experience reflected upon, 
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questioned as to its causes, effects, and values. That in no way happens 
automatically; it must be worked for. The ideal, obviously, is an 
accomplished player using keen ears to ascertain via a theoretically 
sophisticated mind what may be transpiring as the events flow by. That 
package of gifts may have been more the norm in past eras, when 
composers were equally accomplished performers. Specialization in our 
time has robbed many musicians of these polymath aptitudes. 
In your writings you draw a great deal from your experience as a 
performer, and it is clear that much of your work is motivated by the 
constant searchfor solutions to performance problems. Do youfeel that 
all music scholarship should necessarily have some relevance, at least 
indirectly, to performance? Or perhaps will it, by definition? What 
responsibilities, if any, do performers and scholars have in this regard? 
To what extent should we even separate the two roles? 
Good points, some of which I have dealt with in answering the 
previous question. If, as I mention above, music is fundamentally music 
when it is in the process of being performed, then-whether by 
definition or by the facts of reality-musical scholarship, as it bears 
upon any aspect of music, is ultimately perceived in the context of 
performance. That being the case, it seems inescapable that scholars 
and performers share a common responsibility: whatever they do, 
think, or suggest with regard to a piece must be found believable and 
convincing as that piece is experienced and performed. 
Should we separate the two roles, those of scholar and performer, 
as you ask? To a degree the question seems moot. The roles de facto 
are separated, even when assumed by the same person. The scholar 
"scholarizes," the performer performs. I see your question in a 
somewhat different light: it concerns the mutual responsibility of the 
two activities. I think scholarship and theoretical research must be 
relevant to musical issues and will inevitably be tested via the litmus of 
performance. And indeed, as must be obvious from my writings, I 
deeply believe that performers carry a great obligation, that of fidelity 
to the musical work. 
Obviously that fidelity may work itself out in various ways, thus the 
multiplicity of performances of the same work. That is to the good. I 
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don't buy the notion of the "definitive" performance. As Roger 
Sessions once said in his composition seminar at Princeton, such a 
definitive performance would have to be a fictitious one that combined 
all the significant aspects of a work, in all the significant ways these 
aspects had been played throughout the lifetime of the work itself. 
Multiple interpretations of music are therefore not only inevitable but 
desirable. Without it we could buy the one "definitive" CD of the piece 
and be done with it (and inevitably fall asleep from boredom as we hear 
the unchanging, predictable performance for the umpteenth time). What 
I object to is "mindless" performance-the mere rendering of the notes, 
so to speak. But a parallel crime against music may be theorizing that 
is ultimately irrelevant, for whatever reason(s). 
In your discussion of hypermeter on middle levels, you outline two 
possibilities: "[eJither hypermeasure, if initially duple, remains 
fundamentally duple, eventually becoming attenuated and lost to 
perception as the more compelling qualities of phrase 'take over, ' or 
hypermeasure remains parallel with phrase, changing length so as ever 
to encapsulate the dimensions of phrase. ,,6 You seem to prefer the first 
of the two possibilities. Are you not equating phrase with hypermeasure 
(I do believe that there is a distinction)? Therefore, at higher levels, 
would you not conclude that since there are usually no equivalent beats 
(for irregular phrases are the rule), there is no predictable pulse level 
and thus no hypermeter? Should not the analogy be between measures 
and hypermeasures, not measures and phrases? What do you think of 
Rothstein's work when he compares the separation of hypermeasures by 
an extended upbeat to the placement of an improvisatory lead-in 
between two measures, and hypermeasure irregularities in general to 
rubato at the measure level? What do you think of both Rothstein's and 
Schachter's contention that there is an underlying regular hypermeter 
whose hypermeasures may be manipulated in different ways to result in 
sUrface irregularities? Can their point of view not capture the musical 
tensions at middle levels as well as the first of your two outlined 
possibilities? 
6Shaping Time, 34. 
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There are a number of intertwined issues within your question. In 
answering, let me try to sort them out. 
First of all, I am not at all equating hypermeasure with phrase. 
Quite the opposite. I prefer the first of the alternatives that I describe, 
as you rightly perceive. Thus I make a strong distinction between 
hypermeasure time frames, which in their ongoing duple structure are 
often discrepant with phrase lengths, since phrases are frequently 
irregular. Two things follow from this: (1) a conflict between the 
boundaries of hypermeasures and those of phrases and (2) a conflict of 
accents between the two domains, for as I discuss in Shaping Time (pp. 
28-40 and elsewhere in chapter 2), meter and phrase have their own 
intrinsic species of accents. In this context, it is relevant to continue the 
passage that you quote from Shaping Time: "The choice [of how we 
construe such passages] seems not to lie in any intrinsic properties of 
hypermeasures, but rather in the perceptions and cognitive strategies by 
which we make sense of structure on these levels."7 
When you ask, therefore, "should not the analogy be between 
measures and hypermeasures, not measures and phrases?" I am 
puzzled, for I see no analogy in what I have said, nor one that is 
intended. What I have drawn are not analogies but domains, or 
continua-specifically, two of them: one metric, composed of evenly 
spaced beats; the other that of rhythm, which on its tertiary level is 
phrase. The evenly spaced beats of meter on consecutively higher levels 
form measures and ultimately hypermeasures; pulse, the parallel 
phenomenon in the rhythmic domain, progressively forms motives and 
phrases as the levels of organization move consecutively higher. 
To go further with your question, when you ask, ". . . at higher 
levels, would you not conclude that since there are usually no 
equivalent beats (for irregular phrases are the rule), there is no 
predictable pulse level and thus no hypermeter?" I find that your 
question seems to misunderstand the theory I have put forth. For one 
thing, I make a clear distinction between "beat" as the basic-level 
manifestation of meter and "pulse" as the fundamental-level 
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manifestation of rhythm. 8 Your question intermingles these phenomena. 
Nor do I suggest that "there is . . . thus no hypermeter." The 
critical question is not the existence of hypermeter (which I recognize) 
but how broadly does hypermeter extend-on how many levels, and 
thus to what ultimate durations? There are those, Wallace Berry among 
them, who suggest that hypermeter (or "deep meter," as Berry and 
Kramer put it) extends throughout a work and can be perceived as 
such. I take these estimable musicians at their word, though I 
personally cannot perceive hypermetric frames on these levels. I note, 
however (Shaping Time, chapter 2, esp. p. 493 n. 37), that Berry's 
discussion of the dynamic, interchanging character of meter, as we 
move from surface to deeper levels, is close to what other writers see 
as rhythmic phenomena. 
I further discuss in chapter 2 of Shaping Time the fact that 
hypermeter, if it is to be scaled to ever higher levels, thus ever longer 
durational spans, must scale all its elements, not just the span alone. 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff, and Schachter as well, deal with these points. 9 
Higher levels subsume lower ones; lower levels nest within higher 
ones. Thus, "by virtue of scaling, the initial 'beat' on each successively 
greater span should cover proportionately larger segments of time . Yet 
this beat, with its beginning-accent weight, must be felt as a single unit, 
rather than a collection of bars, if the proposition is to hold. It is 
doubtful," I suggest, "whether this is feasible at spans beyond 16 bars, 
if at that length itself." Thus, "if measurement is a primary role of 
meter," which I suggest in earlier passages is a fact of metrical life, 
"and if hypermeasure is a species of meter, then we may question just 
what is measured at macro levels-beyond spans of time per se." 10 
With respect to Rothstein's work, which I greatly admire and 
discuss in this same chapter of my recent book, I find his extended 
upbeat concept, to which you refer, to be convincing. However, this 
8Details concerning critical qualitative distinctions between these domains are 
discussed throughout chapter 2 of Shaping Time; see esp. pp. 29-40. 
9See my precis of their discussions in Shaping Time, 45-47 and associated notes. 
l<1bid., 45. 
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seems to deal with a phrase phenomenon more than with hypermeasure, 
at least as I view the latter term. As for his comparison of 
hypermeasure irregularities with rubato, I have no well-formed opinion 
beyond the thought that mixing terms and modes (hypermeasure 
irregularity, rubato), each of which have relatively clear-cut meanings, 
may not lend greater clarity to these issues. 
I agree with Rothstein's and Schachter's contention, which you 
cite, to the extent that there is an underlying regular meter in tonal 
music. Whether this can be extended to a regular underlying 
hypermeter (and to what durational levels) seems to me an open 
question. You make the interesting point that surface irregularities, 
which they note in connection with hypermeters, may capture musical 
tensions at middle levels; so do the first of the outlined possibilities in 
my system. Do these two approaches share some common theoretical 
ground? Intuitively I suspect that they do. It would be interesting to 
pursue this. 
The studies in parts 3 and 4 of Shaping Time seem to argue not 
only for the existence but also for the aesthetic "necessity" of 
mechanisms of control over tempo-mechanisms explainable in terms 
of the models you propose. Do you feel that similar mechanisms and 
models, as yet undiscovered, must exist in other "discretionary " 
parameters of peiformance, such as dynamics, timbre, vibrato, 
ornamentation, etc.? Are there things that must be left to the 
unexplainable realms of intuition, experience, and tradition, or lS 
everything potentially "modelable"? 
This is a most salient question, particularly in this era, when 
scientific inquiry into so many heretofore unexplored areas is ever 
increasing, and when modeling is such a large part of scientific 
thinking. The question bundles a number of discrete issues, which I 
prefer to deal with separately. 
To take the first one first, do I feel that similar mechanisms and 
models, as yet undiscovered, must exist in other "discretionary" 
parameters of performance, such as dynamics, timbre, vibrato, 
ornamentation, etc.? There are two key qualifiers in this question: (1) 
"as yet undiscovered" and (2) "must" exist. With regard to the first 
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one, clearly the reasonable answer to this, from any empirical 
perspective, must be "perhaps"; i.e., it is possible. Who knows what 
may lie in future discoveries? To deny the possibility of these 
mechanisms or models, to rule out a priori their conceivable discovery, 
would be foolish. That does not mean, however, that I believe they 
exist, only that we must wait and see. 
As for point 2-that these as yet undiscovered mechanisms/models 
"must" exist-no, I do not at all believe that they "must" exist. Some, 
in fact, by virtue of the "discretionary" status that you have (in my 
view, rightly) granted them, are by that status not imperative. Timbre, 
vibrato, dynamics seem to help outline, define, sometimes enrich other 
mechanisms, such as accent, stress, harmony, melodic contour, etc. 
Perhaps a case can be made (or will be made in the future) that 
ornamentation (if we can see these "discretionary" elements in this 
light) in its many forms-visual, aural, linguistic, etc.-is a deeply 
embedded aspect of human consciousness, thus inevitable as part of 
human practice-in this case, in the context of musical composition and 
performance. 
"Are there things that must be left to the unexplainable realms of 
intuition, experience, and tradition, or is everything potentially 
'modelable'?" Again, discrete issues are bundled together in this 
question. Are experience and tradition unexplainable? Certainly what 
historians, cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, physicists, chemists, 
novelists, and anthropologists do is to "explain" experience and 
tradition, in some manner at least. As for intuition, this seems to me 
one of the least defined of terms. Often it is used as a more concise, 
more objective or "modern" substitute for "feeling," or "emotion." 
From all that I can gather, through my studies and from my sense of 
things in the worlds of the social and physical sciences, intuition is a 
complex phenomenon that involves lightning-quick thought 
("ratiocination," to be stuffily academic about it) that is somehow 
melded with affect. Affect seems to serve as a kind of filter, sorting the 
relevant from the irrelevant in this melding process. But then affect is 
itself coming to be understood as a mode of thought, certainly of 
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intelligence. ll If it is, then what, precisely, are we saying in this 
question? 
Is everything potentially modelable? Again, a catchword: 
"potentially." Who is to say, with respect to the future? My intuition 
tells me there are aspects of human nature that are beyond highly 
quantified and predictable modeling and will probably remain so. Some 
practitioners of artificial intelligence research might snort at that view, 
and, if I point out their relative failure to date to capture these qualities, 
would respond that it is only a matter of time. We'll see. 
In Shaping Time, you ask your readers to accept an unusual and at 
times seemingly arbitrary mix of science and art, of empirical testing 
and aesthetic judgment. Careful quantitative studies mingle with 
numerous personal choices: which performances are ideal, which tempi 
are "commonly heard, "what durational units serve as ground beats for 
rubato study or as segments for measuring accelerations and ritards, 
how best to analyze cross-cultural tempo data in each case, or whether 
"scientific" testing should even be attempted at all (as in chapter 8). 
What are your reactions and feelings about this, now that the book is 
out? Are there things you would do differently if you could start over, 
from fifteen years ago? Could (or should) the proportional tempo 
studies of Western music (as in chapter 8) eventually be buttressed by 
more quantitative evidence? What are the most important things to 
consider in evaluating the success of such a mixed scientific/artistic 
approach? 
A salient and perspicacious question. My response must deal 
initially with the underlying premise of Shaping Time. 
To begin with your beginning, indeed the book is a mix of science 
and art, and thereby a mixture of empirical testing and aesthetic 
judgment. Fundamentally, however, this is a book addressed to 
musicians. Science enters the picture, but from the standpoint that we, 
as professional musicians, should consider basic aspects of our 
neurobiology, for they affect the way we make music-or may best 
make it. 
HOn this see D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), 
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That musicians are the main intended audience must be evident from 
the book-in its graphs, musical examples, terminology, references and 
citations, all of which require musical sophistication to be understood. 
Scientists have evinced interest in the book, but that interest seems to 
stem largely from the evidence presented therein, which broadens 
scientific perspectives upon neurobiological processes. 
This underlying premise, I hope, lends coherence to the book's 
format. The performances selected for study, for example, on which 
you comment, are those that seem relevant to the musical argument. 
Likewise with other issues that you raise: durational units selected to 
serve as ground beats for rubato study, units that serve as segments for 
measuring accelerandos and ritards, determinations of how best to 
analyze cross-cultural tempo data-all of these arise from the same 
concern. 
You speak of these as "personal" choices. Are not all choices 
personal? Choice, moreover, is intrinsic to any study, scientific study 
included. Subjectivity in science may be offset by rules of evidence, 
randomizing techniques, double-blind protocols and other methods of 
the experimental canon, but it is well recognized by now that there is 
no total objectivity in science. (Indeed, even the design of an 
experiment, in terms of the methodologies outlined above, involves 
choice.) Einsteinian physics and Heisenbergian quantum theory, to cite 
but two major developments in our century, have made clear this 
impossibility of total scientific objectivity. 
Much of what I have done in Shaping Time involves modeling, one 
of the chief poles that constitute scientific research (the other being 
empirical studies). Intuition is a prime aspect of modeling: paradigm, 
experimental design, and criteria for evidence all involve their share of 
choice, of perspective, from which the personal element cannot be 
completely excised. 
The development of scientific interest in music, and the cross-
disciplinary studies that have resulted over the fifteen years during 
which this book took shape, have a bearing upon the design of Shaping 
Time. Music Perception, perhaps the most widely read interdisciplinary 
journal in music, is only thirteen years old. Numerous other cross-
disciplinary journals of this kind, not to mention a plethora of 
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interdisciplinary books, have come out during this same period. Are 
there things I would do differently, you ask, if I could start over? 
Perhaps so, particularly as a consequence of these developments. 
Some of the scientific information that I provide in my study may not 
be as new now as it was when the book was written, or at least not to 
readers sophisticated in these cross-disciplines. That's the danger of 
writing any large study today: it may be (quasi-)obsolescent by the time 
it appears, as is our new computer virtually as we exit the computer 
store. On the other hand, music theorists literate in matters cognitive 
and neurobiological are still a small fraction of our specialized world. 
And they are not my only hoped-for audience. I would like ultimately 
to reach performers as well as theorists. 
As for the matter of "commonly heard" tempos, used as a criterion 
in chapter 8, or whether "scientific" testing should even be attempted 
at all in that chapter, as you ask: That is a sticky issue. No matter what 
grounds were chosen for these studies of tempo relations, I believe 
there could not be total satisfaction on the part of all readers. 
"Commonly heard tempos" were an issue in point, one that I dealt with 
in note 23 of chapter 8, to wit: 
It would be methodologically neat, in our discussion of tempos 
in Beethoven, Schumann, and other composers, to compile examples 
of recorded performances and to offer their tempos as proof of the 
proportional tempo argument advocated here. It would also be 
unrealistic; for different tempos abound in performances of these 
works, as suggested earlier with Toscanini's fast tempos and 
Klemperer's slow ones occupying extreme ends of the Beethoven 
tempo spectrum. To select such an approach would leave us with the 
fruitless (and unprovable) argument of advocating performer x as a 
"true" advocate of the music, and damning performer y as musical 
infidel. 12 
Thus I sought other musical grounds upon which to base this 
argument, aware at the time that they, as any grounds, were subject to 
12Shaping Time, 528. 
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criticism: 
We have chosen a different approach. Recognizing that most of 
us probably have a generalized sense of appropriate tempos for this 
literature, gained in part from our experience of hearing these 
works, we have designated these tempos as "commonly heard" in 
examples where such tempos are discrepant from composers' 
metronome markings. This places the burden of tempo judgment 
where it properly lies-upon our intuitions, our musical perceptions, 
our experience with the music. Historical information, words of 
wisdom by distinguished musicians may help to verify our 
perceptions. They cannot and should not serve as substitutes for 
intuition and personal experience of the music. 13 
17 
That said, I do believe that follow-up quantitative studies should be 
made of the proportional tempo matters in chapter 8, as you ask. The 
evidence in that chapter, as well as a clearly defined hypothesis, should 
help shape such studies. In view of the problems outlined in my note 
23 (above), it will take well-designed studies to avoid the kinds of 
judgments I indicate. That will require a mode of expertise I do not 
have, but which no doubt exists in the scientific community. 
Lastly, you ask perhaps the ultimate of ultimate questions: What are 
the most important things to consider in evaluating the success of such 
a mixed scientific/artistic approach? My answer may surprise you in its 
seemingly unscientific nature: ultimately I think such a study must 
provoke a believable, gut-instinctive musical response. As indicated 
elsewhere in these comments, we are dealing with a mixture of 
scientific and artistic argument. Part of the fallout of this approach is 
that no one basis of evaluation will suffice. The most sophisticated 
quantitative proofs may fall short of credibility, if the grounds upon 
which they are based seem musically wrong. Alternatively, purely 
musical arguments, if unsupported by evidence-be it musico-structural 
evidence and/or the quantitative data of "science"-can equally fail to 
conVInce. 
13Ibid., 528-29. 
18 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 17/2 
Fundamentally this is a musical study of musical phenomena. I intuit 
thereby that an argument which fails to elicit a convincing musical 
response is ultimately doomed. Scientific evidence may make such a 
response all the more powerful, but it will never replace it. I haven't 
given up on intuition-not at all. 
Shaping Time would probably conform well to most people's idea 
of a "cross-disciplinary" study. Do you think that at least some study 
in disciplines outside of music is necessary for any musician hoping to 
probe some musical issue deeply and comprehensively? Do you have 
advice or warnings for young scholars who contemplate this kind of 
research? 
Your first question has two critical aspects: "deeply" and 
"comprehensively." My answer hangs on both points. Clearly one can 
probe some musical issues deeply while remaining within a purely 
musical context. Most of our received theoretical literature has 
developed from that perspective. "Comprehensively" is another matter, 
particularly in our time. Breadth of coverage in this age seems virtually 
to demand evaluation from multiple perspectives. Almost by definition 
this involves knowledge beyond the purely musical. Therein lies any 
"advice or warnings" that I might offer young scholars, though I 
question whether my singular experience is grounds enough for such 
oracular statements. 
From the experience of developing this book, I have found 
interdisciplinary study tremendously stimulating and exciting in the 
endless ways that it opens new points of view and new insights. The 
speed with which such studies are proliferating suggests that others are 
similarly convinced. 
There is a price attached, obviously-one connected with the depth 
of knowledge required in fields not one's own. Given a generally broad 
education, of the liberal arts variety that regrettably seems to be going 
out of fashion, I think one has a base from which to delve into new 
fields. It helps to have a colleague in these new fields, hopefully one 
equally interested in the cross-disciplinary adventure, who can guide, 
advise, share ideas, and generally help in finding one's way. 
Ultimately these cross-disciplinary studies require expertise in each 
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of their component fields. The knowledge revolution has gone so far so 
quickly that it is unrealistic for anyone to expect not only similar levels 
of knowledge in other fields but, equally important, similar levels of 
professional judgment (and thereby, to hark back to an earlier question, 
of professional choice). 
This has to be, therefore, a shared enterprise. That is not always an 
easy thing to attain, nor is it always successful. It seems the way of the 
future, however. My experience convinces me that it is a significant 
and rewarding way. Hopefully we are developing a new generation of 
scholars, performers and theorists whose training benefits from breadth 
as well as depth. Hopefully they will be prepared for the scope of these 
big questions, and energized by their challenge. 
